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Ethnic differences are often considered to be powerful sources of diverse economic 
behavior. In this paper, we investigate whether and how ethnicity affects Ukrainian 
labor market outcomes. Using micro data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (ULMS) and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of earnings, we find 
a persistent and rising labor market divide between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians 
throughout Ukraine’s transition era. We establish that language rather than nationality 
is the key factor behind this ethnic premium favoring Russians. Our findings further 
document that this premium is larger among males than among females.  
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1. Introduction  
 
  The role of ethnicity in the labor market has been one of the central themes of 
labor economics since the groundbreaking work of Gary Becker (1957). The ensuing 
literature investigates gaps in labor market performance between ethnic majorities and 
minorities, generally assigning significant parts of these gaps to discrimination against 
ethnic minorities by the respective majority populations.
1 Discrimination itself is 
taken as an explanatory variable that reflects social, political, or economic 
subordination of ethnic minorities. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) have developed 
the analytical tools to measure discrimination in a statistical sense. These tools have 
been widely applied in the literature, and are also used in this paper.  
  Yet, very little is known about the link between labor market discrimination 
and subordination of ethnic groups. In this paper we investigate the labor market 
performance of ethnic groups under the conditions of changing patterns of ethnic 
subordination. Following Becker (1957) we understand ethnic discrimination as a 
deviation from a market solution that is driven by unfounded positive or negative 
feelings towards some ethnic groups. Ethnic divide in the labor market is a more 
general phenomenon that can result from ethnic discrimination or from differences in 
ethnic capital. An observed ethnic divide will inevitably create winners and losers, 
where the winners enjoy what we call an ethnic premium. Such a premium may be 
                                                 
1 Examples of empirical contributions include Card and Lemieux (1994), who study Black-White wage 
differentials in the context of general wage structure changes in the US, Trejo (1997), who looks at 
Mexican American workers and explains their relatively low wages by human capital differentials, and 
Constant and Massey (2005), who study the occupational and earnings attainment of German guest 
workers. Altonji and Blank (1998) provide an exhaustive account of the literature on the role of race in 
the labor market.   2
caused by reverse ethnic discrimination or by specific ethnic advantages involved in 
ethnic capital. Whereas we apply the econometric tools of the discrimination 
literature, we prefer not to use the term discrimination but the terms ethnic divide and 
ethnic premium.   
  Ukraine offers a unique historical experiment of close social and economic 
interaction between two distinct ethnic groups, the Russians and the Ukrainians that 
underwent a political turnaround.
2 In particular, upon the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians experienced a reversal of 
subordination patterns. As ethnic Russians were privileged in the Ukraine of the 
SSSR, in the independent state Ukraine, the ethnic Ukrainians should enjoy the 
privileges (Stewart, 2005). Thus, Ukraine’s history enables us to study a labor market 
ethnic divide that evolved over time in the context of the discussed reversal of ethnic 
subordination and Ukraine’s transition towards a market economy. A natural 
hypothesis is that an originally privileged group (the ethnic Russians) looses their 
economic position to the newly dominant group (the ethnic Ukrainians), at least in the 
political realm.  
  Our primary objective in this paper is to investigate whether and how ethnic 
differences have shaped the performance of Russians and Ukrainians in the Ukrainian 
labor market during the transition period. First, using the Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (ULMS), we apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to identify 
                                                 
2 While researchers had long been overlooking Ukraine and focusing their interest on the labor markets 
in Russia or other transition countries, more recently a number of researchers have shown keen interest 
in this country. Namely, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2005) investigate the returns to 
schooling in Ukraine and Russia, Lehmann et al. (2006) study the incidence and cost of job loss in the 
Ukrainian labor market, and, in a series of papers, Ganguli and Terrell (2005a-b, 2006) provide an 
account of the key factors that drive wage inequality in Ukraine’s transition economy.   3
which dimensions of ethnicity, language or nationality, drive the ethnic divide in the 
Ukrainian labor market. Second, we scrutinize the extent to which such differences 
determine interethnic performance gaps, and study whether and how the reversal of 
the patterns of subordination of ethnic groups shaped such deviations in the Ukrainian 
labor market. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the 
dataset. Second, we develop our estimation strategy to detect economic differences 
and the dimensions of ethnicity that drive them. Third, we depict time paths of the 
ethnic divide. Finally, we summarize the findings and conclude.    
 
2. Ethnicity and the Economy in Ukraine  
 
  The ethnic identity of the inhabitants of the present-time Ukraine is a result of 
turbulent past developments. The two largest ethnic peoples, the Russians and 
Ukrainians, originate from the same ancient state of Kievan Rus.
3 After the fall of 
Kievan Rus, Russians and Ukrainians emerged as distinct ethnic groups over the 
centuries of foreign rulers, including the Russian Empire, Poland, the Cossack state, 
and Austro-Hungary, that governed large parts of the present-time Ukraine. Ukrainian 
identity developed in spite of Russification by Imperial Russia. After the Russian 
Revolution in 1917 and its brief independence
4 until 1922, Ukraine was incorporated 
into the USSR as the Ukrainian SSR. As a Soviet State, the Ukraine was stamped by 
                                                 
3 Also known as Kievan Ruthenia, it was an important state with Kiev as its capital and lasted from 
about 880 until the middle of the 12
th century. 
4 In two states, Ukrainian People’s Republic and West Ukrainian People’s Republic.    4
Russian dominance in social, economic, and political life.
 Yet the Ukrainian identity 
and language has survived and persisted. 
  Since August 1991, the Ukrainian language has been reinstated as the official 
language, and ethnic Ukrainians are the largest ethnic group in the new state. To wit, 
in the 2001 Ukrainian Census 67.5% of the country’s population named Ukrainian 
and 29.6% named Russian as their native language. With independence ethnic 
Ukrainians gained a dominant position in the Russian-Ukrainian ethnic relations in 
Ukraine. 
  Nowadays, it is primarily language and nationality that distinguish ethnic 
Russians and Ukrainians. Russian and Ukrainian languages are similar but distinct. 
Whereas language is a directly observable dimension of ethnicity, nationality is not 
directly observable in Ukraine. Yet, employers can indirectly observe employees’ 
nationality from their behavior, preferences, names, religious denomination, and the 
like. We take these two measures of ethnicity as exogenous with respect to individual 
socio-economic characteristics. 
  Ukraine’s economic system from 1922 until 1991, as a state of the Soviet 
Union, was a command economy. This type of economy is summarized by Kornai 
(1980). Its main features were state-owned productive resources, centralized 
allocation of resources, and centralized administration of price setting. Wages were 
administratively determined by central authorities, who provided employers with 
wage tables based on employee’s experience, working conditions, and type of 
occupation. While the principle of equal pay for equal work regardless of gender or 
ethnicity was embedded in the Soviet laws, occupational segregation and   5
discriminatory promotion practices resulted in significant gender and ethnic earnings 
differentials.
5  
  After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine embarked on a 
transition path towards the market economy. Among other reforms, wage setting was 
decentralized and bargaining between trade unions and employers was promoted. 
Despite some transient moves towards centralization, the Ukrainian transition is 
characterized by gradual liberalization and decentralization of wage bargaining. 
Although the Ukrainian Constitution guarantees equal employment and labor rights 
regardless of gender and ethnicity, no explicit antidiscrimination policies are in effect 
in Ukraine (Ganguli and Terrell, 2006). The country still suffers from a market-
unfriendly institutional base. Due to the inherited Soviet structure, Ukraine only 
slowly developed the institutions needed to reap the advantages of a market economy 




  The Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS), carried out in 2003 
and 2004 is the primary source of information for this study.
6 ULMS is a nationally 
representative survey of 8,621 individuals from 4,056 households. Besides a number 
of standard demographic variables at the individual and household level, it contains 
                                                 
5 Despite the egalitarian principle, women were treated as a specific labor force and were restricted 
from working in occupations that were considered to be harmful to their maternity and childcare 
function, or to their biological and psychological peculiarities. This policy resulted in concentration of 
women in white-collar jobs, while men were overrepresented in blue-collar jobs (Ogloblin, 1999). 
6 For a more detailed description of the ULMS see Lehmann et al. (2006), Gorodnichenko and 
Sabirianova Peter (2005), or Ganguli and Terrell (2006).   6
detailed information about the labor market experience of individuals in 2003 and 
2004. It also includes a retrospective section from which individual labor market 
experience as well as a number of demographic variables can be completely 
reconstructed back to 1997 and for the years 1991 and 1986.  
  While sharing common historical and cultural origin, Russian and Ukrainian 
ethnic groups in Ukraine are primarily distinguished by language and nationality. 
Therefore, we take self-reported nationality and primary domestic language in the 
2003 wave of the ULMS as the defining factors of ethnicity in the present context. In 
particular, respondents were asked to indicate their nationality from a list including 
Ukrainian, Russian, Byelorussian, Jewish, or other nationality. For their first domestic 
language, they had to choose from a list including Ukrainian, Russian, mixed Russian 
and Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Jewish, Polish, Hungarian, or other. Surzhyk, an 
amalgam of the Russian and Ukrainian languages, is another language. We will use 
the word Surzhyk to denote the language of those people who reported mixed Russian 
and Ukrainian as their primary domestic language.
7 We study only Russians and 
Ukrainians as they are the two largest ethnic groups in Ukraine.  
  From the total of 37,644 individuals in ULMS, who are older than 18 and 
younger than the statutory retirement age (60 for men and 55 for women), and who 
are not in the military or in prison we select individuals who fall in the first to ninety-
ninth percentile of the wage distribution and are employed full-time. Furthermore, we 
eliminate observations with missing data in key variables, including gender, age, 
                                                 
7 Out of the Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian as their first language about 12% speak Russian as their 
second domestic language, 86% speak Russian, and all understand Russian. Out of Russians who speak 
Russian as their first language about 11% speak Ukrainian as their second domestic language, 46% 
speak Ukrainian, and 69% understand Ukrainian.   7
education, and experience. These restrictions leave us with 18,241 observations in the 
baseline sample. Table 1 summarizes the frequencies of the individuals in our sample 
by nationality and language. From these frequencies it is apparent that the group of 
people who identify as Russian and speak Ukrainian or Surzhyk as their first domestic 
language is relatively small (1.7%). In fact, in 2003 this group represents only 26 
males and 19 females. For this reason, we do not investigate this ethno-linguistic 
group further as a separate group.
8 
 
Nationality Ukrainian Surzhyk Russian Total
Ukrainian 43.40% 11.00% 27.20% 81.70%
Russian 0.70% 1.00% 16.60% 18.30%
Total 44.10% 12.00% 43.80% 100%
Table 1
Proportions of individuals by nationality and language
Language
Note: Percentages need not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.  
 
  In Table 2 we summarize wages, age, and key indicators of human capital for 
each ethno-linguistic group in Ukraine by gender. We measure wages using monthly 
contractual salary in the main job.
9 All wages, including those in foreign currencies, 
are normalized to the 2003 Ukrainian Hryvnias using deflators as provided by the UN 
Statistics Division, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and EconStats. 
Across genders, we observe that Russian speakers, on average, earn 
considerably more than the Ukrainian or Surzhyk speaking individuals. The wages of 
the two Russian speaking groups are similar, as are the earnings of Ukrainian and 
Surzhyk speaking groups. Consistently, the average male earns a considerably higher 
                                                 
8 Note that we do not drop members of this group from the analysis, but, whenever applicable, we 
merge them into the larger linguistic or national groups.  
9 Literature on the former Soviet Union suggests looking at contractual monthly wages rather than 
actually received wages, due to substantial wage arrears. See e.g. Ganguli and Terrell (2006).   8
wage than the average female. As concerns the indicators of human capital, Russian 
speaking Russians appear to be on average somewhat older, more experienced, and 
more educated than the other ethno-linguistic groups. Russian speaking ethnic 
Ukrainians, on the other hand, are on average somewhat younger and less experienced 





Ukrainian Surzhyk Russian Russian
Language Language Language Language
355.1 375.8 476.4 450.3
-200.9 -212 -238.4 -240.5
40.1 39.6 37.8 40.6
-10.8 -11 -11 -11.2
11.9 11.5 12 12.2
-1.9 -1.8 -1.9 -2
22.2 22.1 19.7 22.4
-10.9 -11 -11 -11.3
Observations 3,665 1,063 2,334 1,423
260.7 269.9 295.4 303
-136.5 -134 -154.1 -154.7
39.6 40.2 37.6 40.9
-9.2 -8.8 -9.7 -9.2
12.2 12.1 12.4 12.7
-2 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9
21.4 22.1 19.2 22.2
-9.6 -9.3 -10 -9.2
Observations 4,250 945 2,629 1,602
Experience

















  For a closer look at interethnic earnings differentials, we break up the median 
earnings differentials by nationality, language, and gender for each year. In Figures 
1a-c we plot the profiles of Ukrainian men and women. We observe that the wage 
differentials between the three linguistic groups of ethnic Ukrainians are larger for 
males than for females. While Russian speaking females enjoy up to 25% wage 
premium over Ukrainian and Surzhyk speaking women, the respective wage 
advantage of Russian speaking males ranges between 21 and 60%. On the other hand,   9
the wage gap between Surzhyk and Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians is fluctuating 
around zero. While in most cases these wage gaps do not follow distinct trends, the 
wage advantage of Russian speaking males vis-à-vis their Ukrainian speaking 
































Ukrainian males: Russian vs. Ukrainian speaking































Russian males Russian speaking vs. Ukrainian males Ukrainian speaking































Ukrainian males: Russian vs. Surzhyk speaking































Russian males Russian speaking vs. Ukrainian males Surzhyk speaking
































Ukrainian males: Surzhyk vs. Ukrainian speaking































Russian males Russian speaking vs. Ukrainian males Russian speaking
Russian females Russian speaking vs. Ukrainian females Russian speaking
(c) (f) 
Figure 1. Median interethnic wage ratios over time  
by nationality, language and gender. 
 
  Figures 1d-f compare Russian speaking Russians to the three linguistic groups 
of people of Ukrainian nationality by gender for each year. As above, the wage gap is   10
typically larger for males than females. Russian speaking Russian females earn up to 
35% more than Ukrainian and Surzhyk speaking females of Ukrainian nationality. 
The respective wage gap for males ranges between 11 and 50%. Remarkably, the 
wage gaps are typically non-decreasing. Finally, Figure 1f shows that nationality does 
not seem to matter if people of different nationalities speak the same (Russian) 
language. The major point that stands out from Figure 1 is that there are significant 
and persistent earnings differentials between ethno-linguistic groups in Ukraine that 
are predominantly driven by language. It is interesting that their patterns differ 
between genders. 
 
4. Estimation Framework 
 
  Earnings differentials between ethnic groups can be attributed to differences 
across these groups in (i) individual characteristics such as age, experience, education, 
and talent or (ii) labor market returns to these characteristics. While observable 
individual characteristics may differentiate ethnic groups and generate earnings 
differentials, they alone do not imply any direct role of ethnicity in the labor market, 
if comparable individuals of different ethnicities are treated equally. On the other 
hand, if observably identical individuals from different ethnic groups earn different 
wages, ethnicity directly affects the performance of ethnic groups in the labor market. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate the role of ethnicity in the Ukrainian labor market we 
focus on the latter source of earnings differentials that we denote as ethnic divide. An 
ethnic divide can result from ethnic differences caused by unfounded feelings as in 
the case of ethnic discrimination or from differences in unmeasured ethnic capital. An   11
observed ethnic divide will inevitably create winners and losers, with the winners 
enjoying what we call an ethnic premium. 
  The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique has the advantage to identify 
the factors behind earnings differentials. In particular, it decomposes earnings 
differentials into two parts: the one explained by observable individual characteristics 
and the one that is unexplained and is due to differences in returns to individual 
characteristics or differences in unobservable characteristics. To this extent we will be 
able to distinguish whether interethnic earnings differentials arise due to different 
characteristics of different ethnic groups or due to an ethnic divide in the labor 
market.  
  The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition also serves our objective to understand the 
roles of the two abovementioned dimensions of ethnicity – language and nationality – 
in shaping the labor market divide in Ukraine. In particular, partitioning the labor 
force by language and nationality and then evaluating labor market differences 
between such defined ethnic groups reveals which of the two dimensions of ethnicity 
drives labor market discrimination. In the context of ethno-linguistic earnings 
differentials we consider the Neumark (1988) method as the most appropriate, since it 
relates group-wise models to the pooled model that assumes no discrimination in 
returns.  
  The standard Mincer (1974) earnings equation is a parsimonious description of 
earnings profiles that is theoretically well motivated and fits the data remarkably well 
in most contexts. Our augmented Mincerian equation is:  
 
() ε β β β β α + + + + + = Z X X E Wage Log 4
2
2 1 0              (1) 
   12
where the coefficients β  represent the rate of return to schooling (E), experience (X), 
and other characteristics (Z), such as year, regional, occupational, and industrial 
dummies, and ε  is the error term assumed to satisfy  ( ) 0 , , | = Z X E E ε . 
  In the estimation of the earnings profiles, we disaggregate by gender, as it is 
well known that male and female earnings profiles differ. The effects of education on 
earnings are captured by five levels of schooling: (i) less than high school, the 
benchmark, (ii) High School (high school diploma), (iii) Vocational (vocational 
secondary or elementary school), (iv) Secondary Professional (diploma of technical, 
medical, pedagogical, musical art, or other secondary  professional school), (v) 
Incomplete Higher (at least three years in an institute, an academy, a university, but 
no degree or diploma), and (vi) Complete Higher (Bachelor’s or Master’s degree, 
diploma, or PhD equivalent from an institute, a university, or an academy). 
Experience is defined as potential experience, calculated as age minus years of 
education minus six. Other controls include nine occupational and ten industrial 
categories as well as five macro-regions (Center and North, East, Kiev City, South, 
and West).   
  In Table 3 we report the baseline results of equation (1) for each ethno-
linguistic group on data pooled over all years, controlling for year but not for region, 
occupation, or industry. We observe that the coefficients have signs consistent with 
previous findings in the literature. We further find that although the general 
coefficient patterns are similar across ethno-linguistic groups, coefficients vary across 
groups. 
   13
Russian
Nationality
Russian Russian Surzhyk Russian Russian
Language Language Language Language Language
0.098* -0.049 0.156** -0.098 0.112** -0.118 0.271** 0.148*
(0.043) (0.064) (0.049) (0.065) (0.032) (0.070) (0.045) (0.067)
0.099* 0.05 0.206** 0.01 0.159** -0.097 0.273** 0.012
(0.043) (0.066) (0.045) (0.063) (0.035) (0.074) (0.045) (0.068)
0.231** 0.208** 0.236** 0.112 0.180** -0.162* 0.199** 0.187**
(0.044) (0.066) (0.046) (0.067) (0.033) (0.072) (0.044) (0.065)
0.176* 0.281** 0.345** -0.035 0.468** -0.274** 0.209** 0.045
(0.076) (0.102) (0.093) (0.094) (0.059) (0.083) (0.066) (0.113)
0.374** 0.143* 0.286** 0.231** 0.439** 0.115 0.458** 0.354**
(0.044) (0.072) (0.049) (0.064) (0.034) (0.079) (0.045) (0.066)
  Experience
0.010** 0.013* 0.020** 0.019** 0.012** 0.020** 0.006 0.025**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
-0.026** -0.026* -0.051** -0.052** -0.026** -0.057** -0.005 -0.061**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012)
  Dummies
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 5.892** 5.883** 5.986** 6.136** 5.493** 5.775** 5.542** 5.427**
(0.056) (0.100) (0.074) (0.097) (0.050) (0.095) (0.070) (0.084)
R-squared 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.14
Log Wage 5.73 5.79 6.04 5.97 5.45 5.49 5.57 5.6
(stand. dev.) (0.55) (0.53) (0.51) (0.55) (0.47) (0.44) (0.47) (0.46)
Observations 3,665 1,063 2,334 1,423 4,250 945 2,629 1,602
Table 3

























Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
The measured differences resulting from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
estimation are shown in Table 4. In this exercise we find that there are significant 
earnings differentials among all pairs of ethno-linguistic groups, regardless of gender. 
In all cases it appears that being a Russian or Surzhyk speaker is an advantage. For 
Russian speakers, males with Russian nationality earn less than their counterparts 
with Ukrainian nationality. Interestingly, the opposite holds for females. In general, 
the magnitudes of differentials are larger for males than for females. The key finding 
is that observable individual characteristics do not fully explain observed ethno-
linguistic wage differentials. 
   14
Russian Surzhyk Russian
Language Language Language
Ukrainian Surzhyk 0.062** 0.046**





Russian 0.317** 0.254** 0.125** 0.079**
Language (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017)
-0.002 0.006 -0.005 -0.01
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
0.319** 0.248** 0.130** 0.089**
(0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.016)
Russian 0.242** 0.179** -0.075** 0.155** 0.109** 0.029*
Language (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015)
0.004 0.022** -0.002 0.027** 0.028** 0.032**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
0.237** 0.157** -0.073** 0.128** 0.081** -0.003
(0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014)
Table 4
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, by gender
Males Females













Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% A positive number implies that the row 








  Besides education, experience, and year there are other important factors that 
explain earnings and earnings differentials between ethnic groups. Such factors 
include geographical, occupational, and industrial concentrations of different ethno-
linguistic groups. It is for example well known that the eastern regions of Ukraine, 
which are the most industrialized, are predominantly populated by Russian speakers. 
Occupational and industrial specialization along ethnic lines may be present as a 
consequence of the periods of Soviet discriminatory policies.  
In Table 5 we report results of a pooled OLS model similar to equation (1), but 
controlling for regional, occupational, and industrial characteristics as well. We 
observe that the explanatory power measured by R
2 increases about three times, 
indicating that these control variables explain a large part of earnings inequality. On 
the other hand, the general patterns of the effects of education, age, and experience 
are similar to those in the baseline analysis reported in Table 3, indicating that their 
effects are independent of region, industry, or occupation. Due to a number of missing   15
observations for these control variables, the numbers of observations are somewhat 




Russian Russian Surzhyk Russian Russian
Language Language Language Language Language
0.049 -0.148* 0.073 0.026 0.004 -0.160* 0.200** 0.04
(0.041) (0.066) (0.046) (0.068) (0.034) (0.079) (0.052) (0.054)
0.027 -0.047 0.144** 0.021 0.054 -0.173* 0.270** -0.034
(0.041) (0.068) (0.044) (0.068) (0.036) (0.082) (0.050) (0.053)
0.124** 0.043 0.170** 0.118 0.066 -0.197* 0.133* 0.074
(0.043) (0.073) (0.045) (0.075) (0.036) (0.078) (0.052) (0.052)
0.103 -0.057 0.062 0.065 0.260** -0.580** 0.206** -0.029
(0.074) (0.117) (0.102) (0.094) (0.057) (0.107) (0.066) (0.104)
0.304** -0.075 0.292** 0.248** 0.259** -0.062 0.318** 0.180**
(0.049) (0.079) (0.054) (0.072) (0.041) (0.090) (0.054) (0.058)
  Experience
0.006* 0.011* 0.023** 0.015** 0.016** 0.014* 0.007* 0.024**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
-0.018** -0.019 -0.056** -0.042** -0.036** -0.045** -0.01 -0.057**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011)
  Dummies
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.914** 5.815** 5.679** 6.170** 5.615** 6.085** 5.804** 5.721**
(0.065) (0.118) (0.095) (0.140) (0.061) (0.114) (0.101) (0.109)
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.44 0.34 0.34
Log Wage 5.73 5.78 6.04 5.97 5.44 5.49 5.57 5.6
(stand. dev.) (0.55) (0.54) (0.51) (0.55) (0.47) (0.44) (0.47) (0.46)
Observations 3,337 971 2,074 1,210 3,915 873 2,389 1,459





























In Table 6 we report the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the model in 
which the regional and industry effects are accounted for. Comparing it to the baseline 
decomposition reported in Table 4, we observe that the unexplained share of earnings 
differentials is relatively smaller and the explained share becomes significant and 
relatively larger. Yet, the unexplained part of earnings differentials remains strongly 
significant, in general favoring Russian speakers.  
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Russian Surzhyk Russian
Language Language Language
Ukrainian Surzhyk 0.051* 0.043*





Russian 0.302** 0.251** 0.131** 0.089**
Language (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.018)
0.219** 0.153** 0.079** 0.017*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012)
0.083** 0.098** 0.052** 0.072**
(0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014)
Russian 0.232** 0.181** -0.070** 0.155** 0.113** 0.024
Language (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016)
0.171** 0.120** -0.032** 0.096** 0.049** 0.027**
(0.014) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
0.061** 0.061** -0.038* 0.059** 0.063** -0.003
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013)
Table 6
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition with regional, occupational, and industrial controls, by gender
Males Females













Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% A positive number implies that the row 








  Examining the unexplained parts of earnings differentials, we observe that the 
ethnic divide between Russian speakers of Russian and Ukrainian nationalities is 
barely significant in the case of males and insignificant in the case of females. In 
contrast, the labor market does favor these two groups vis-à-vis Surzhyk and 
Ukrainian speakers, and hence provides an ethnic premium to Russian speakers. In 
comparison with Ukrainian and Surzhyk speakers, the magnitudes of these differences 
are similar for Russian speakers of Russian and Ukrainian nationality. Finally, 
Surzhyk and Ukrainian speaking males of Ukrainian nationality are treated almost 
identically by the labor market. In contrast, the labor market somewhat favors 
Surzhyk over Ukrainian speaking women of Ukrainian nationality. 
  Naturally, we want to investigate whether there is an effect of unobserved 
individual characteristics that are randomly distributed among individuals on the 
estimated patterns of labor market discrimination. For that purpose, we estimate a 
random effects model. The results reported in Table 7 reveal that allowing for random   17
effects has little bearing on the estimated coefficients. Results on the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition exercise are presented in Table 8. Surprisingly, we cannot find any 





Russian Russian Surzhyk Russian Russian
Language Language Language Language Language
0.101 -0.088 0.066 0.134 -0.011 -0.239 0.167* -0.136
(0.057) (0.090) (0.073) (0.086) (0.045) (0.142) (0.066) (0.075)
0.082 0.005 0.053 0.063 0.036 -0.305 0.119 -0.148
(0.059) (0.097) (0.075) (0.077) (0.050) (0.163) (0.065) (0.082)
0.144* 0.138 0.096 0.257** 0.08 -0.333* 0.088 -0.027
(0.061) (0.113) (0.078) (0.090) (0.051) (0.152) (0.070) (0.079)
0.168 -0.11 -0.022 0.133 0.06 -0.573** 0.199* 0.006
(0.089) (0.162) (0.127) (0.130) (0.066) (0.198) (0.081) (0.110)
0.363** 0.135 0.231* 0.300** 0.178** -0.219 0.229** 0.132
(0.073) (0.121) (0.091) (0.105) (0.057) (0.162) (0.074) (0.089)
  Experience
0.013** 0.011 0.032** 0.021** 0.017** 0.004 0.012* 0.017**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
-0.032** -0.026 -0.076** -0.053** -0.039** -0.024 -0.024* -0.047**
(0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014)
  Dummies
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.819** 5.695** 5.647** 5.904** 5.598** 6.132** 5.823** 6.049**
(0.098) (0.153) (0.148) (0.255) (0.086) (0.191) (0.145) (0.153)
Observations 3182 931 1966 1137 3715 830 2263 1383

























Earnings profiles with random individual effects by nationality, language, and gender
Males Females
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Russian Surzhyk Russian
Language Language Language
Ukrainian Surzhyk 0.071 0.049





Russian 0.314** 0.243** 0.144** 0.095**
Language (0.027) (0.040) (0.022) (0.033)
0.205** 0.129** 0.066** 0.009
(0.021) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016)
0.109** 0.113** 0.079** 0.086**
(0.017) (0.029) (0.016) (0.028)
Russian 0.246** 0.174** -0.068 0.158** 0.109** 0.013
Language (0.034) (0.046) (0.037) (0.025) (0.035) (0.027)
0.169** 0.105** -0.023 0.087** 0.038* 0.026*
(0.024) (0.028) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011)
0.076** 0.070* -0.045 0.070** 0.071* -0.012
(0.024) (0.035) (0.034) (0.018) (0.029) (0.025)
Table 8
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition with random individual effects, by gender
Males Females













Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% A positive number implies that the row 








5. Measured Ethnic Divide  
 
  Based on the results depicted above, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
suggests that it is language rather than nationality that drives the labor market divide 
between Russians and Ukrainians. Given this finding, we estimate the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition for linguistic groups.
10 In the first step, we merge Russian speakers of 
Russian and Ukrainian nationality to form the Russian linguistic group. We construct 
Surzhyk speaking and Ukrainian speaking linguistic groups similarly. For these 
groups, we replicate the regressions and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of Tables 5 
and 6. We present these results in Table 9. The upshot of this exercise is that the 
                                                 
10 We have investigated partition of labor force by nationality. Results on the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition, available upon request, show that earnings differentials between people with Russian 
and Ukrainian nationality are fully explained by differences in characteristics rather than by differences 
in coefficients (labor market discrimination). Language, as expected, turns out as a significant 
explanatory variable of the earnings of different groups defined by nationality.   19
general patterns of earnings profiles are similar to those observed previously. The 
additional dummy variable that identifies Russian nationality is insignificant for all 
linguistic groups except for the Russian speaking males, where it is negative at a 
marginal significance level. This finding further supports our previous findings that 
nationality is not a source of labor market divide in Ukraine. 
 
Ukrainian Surzhyk Russian Ukrainian Surzhyk Russian
Language Language Language Language Language Language
0.003 -0.077 -0.041* -0.006 0.034 -0.004
(0.097) (0.051) (0.018) (0.043) (0.052) (0.014)
  Education
0.051 -0.157* 0.057 0.011 -0.088 0.117**
(0.041) (0.064) (0.038) (0.033) (0.070) (0.038)
0.026 -0.029 0.104** 0.061 -0.072 0.142**
(0.041) (0.065) (0.037) (0.035) (0.071) (0.037)
0.123** 0.028 0.156** 0.074* -0.117 0.103**
(0.043) (0.067) (0.039) (0.035) (0.069) (0.038)
0.1 -0.067 0.078 0.267** -0.510** 0.119*
(0.075) (0.115) (0.069) (0.057) (0.101) (0.053)
0.292** -0.08 0.289** 0.269** 0.017 0.239**
(0.049) (0.076) (0.042) (0.040) (0.082) (0.040)
  Experience
0.006 0.010* 0.021** 0.017** 0.012* 0.014**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
-0.017* -0.022 -0.053** -0.036** -0.040** -0.029**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
  Dummies
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.923** 5.897** 5.864** 5.606** 6.049** 5.776**
(0.065) (0.109) (0.079) (0.061) (0.107) (0.073)
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.23 0.32 0.42 0.32
Log Wage 5.73 5.78 6.01 5.44 5.49 5.58
(stand. dev.) (0.55) (0.54) (0.53) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47)




















  In Table 10 we report the corresponding Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. As 
before, judged by the unexplained component of earnings differentials, the differential 
is slightly larger for males than for females. The only exception to this finding is that 
the earnings differentials between Surzhyk and Ukrainian speakers are larger for   20
females. In fact, it turns out that, based on the (in-)significance of the unexplained 
parts of earnings differentials, we could treat Ukrainian and Surzhyk speaking males 
as a single linguistic group.
11 This is not the case for females, however. Female 
Surzhyk speakers are differentiated from both their Russian and Ukrainian speaking 
counterparts in the labor market. 
 
Ukrainian Surzhyk Ukrainian Surzhyk







Russian 0.277** 0.230** 0.140** 0.095**
Language (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016)
0.209** 0.122** 0.092** 0.033**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)
0.068** 0.107** 0.048** 0.062**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013)
Table 10







Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
A positive number implies that the row group earns more than the respective 





  Having shown that ethnicity engenders earnings differentials in the Ukrainian 
labor market, and that these are mainly driven by linguistic segmentation in the labor 
force, we now proceed to investigate time paths of these differentials. That is, we 
investigate whether interethnic earnings differentials or the ethnic divide diminished 
or enlarged during the Ukraine’s transition period. In particular, we ask whether there 
are any effects of Ukraine’s independence on the ethnic premium in the labor market. 
To evaluate the time paths of ethno-linguistic earnings differentials, we run the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition separately for each year. The small size of the 
                                                 
11 We performed analysis based on such partition of the labor force. The results did not differ from 
those based on the partition adopted in this section.    21
Surzhyk linguistic group does not permit investigation of time paths of earnings 
differentials. However, we are able to investigate the time paths of the earnings divide 
between Russian and Ukrainian speakers.  
In Figure 2 we illustrate these results. We observe that Russian speakers enjoy 
a relatively stable wage advantage over Ukrainian speakers. A large part of this wage 
advantage is explained by observable factors. Namely, for both the male and female 
samples, age, education, experience, as well as occupational, industrial, and regional 
distribution provide an advantage to the Russian speakers. A significant part of this 
wage advantage, however, remains unexplained, signifying an ethnic divide and a 
Russian ethnic premium. This ethnic premium exhibits a nonmonotonic time path. For 
both sexes, after the initial rise from insignificant values, the Russian ethnic premium 
peaks in 2002 for males and in 1999 for females; it somewhat declines thereafter. The 
Russian ethnic premium is for the most part larger in the case of males. The explained 
part of the earnings differential, however, is substantially higher in the case of males, 
significantly contributing to the much larger ethnic earnings differential among males 




























































(a) Males  (b) Females 
Figure 2. Time paths of the ethnic earnings differentials and the ethnic premia.  
Russian and Ukrainian linguistic groups. 
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Interestingly, the ethnic divide in the labor market was insignificant at the 
inception of the transition era. This finding implies that the Soviet domination in 
Ukraine prior to 1991 did not engender an ethnic premium in favor of Russian 
speakers in the Ukrainian labor market, albeit Russian speakers enjoyed numerous 
privileges, including a higher ranked occupational, industrial, and regional 
distribution that generated earnings gaps in their favor. Apparently, the liberalization 
of the Ukrainian labor market created an environment in which these advantageous 
characteristics of Russian speakers brought about an ethnic premium in their favor. 
While the effects of Ukraine’s independence and the cessation of Soviet dominance in 
the country did not suffice to countervail these market effects initially, more recent 
years of the transition have witnessed a diminishing advantage of Russian speakers 




  While relations between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine are an 
integral part of Ukrainian politics as evidenced, for instance, by ethnic fragmentation 
during the Orange revolution, few understand the role of ethnicity and its 
ramifications in the Ukrainian labor market. In this paper we shed light on this issue 
using decomposition estimation techniques that allow us to distinguish between the 
part of earnings differentials that is due to an ethnic divide from the part that is due to 
differences in human capital and other individual and group characteristics.  
  Our main finding is that ethnicity, manifested via language, significantly 
affects individual earnings in Ukraine. That is, workers of Russian ethnicity earn 
significantly more than their Ukrainian counterparts. While the earnings gap between   23
workers of different nationalities can be explained by their different observable 
characteristics, a significant part of the earnings gap between linguistic groups 
remains unexplained. In particular, throughout the transition period, the Russian 
speaking workers enjoy an ethnic premium in the Ukrainian labor market, peaking in 
1999 for females and 2002 for males. The ethnic premium is for the most part larger 
among males than among females.  
Time paths of the divide of linguistic groups suggest that market forces, in 
combination with the initial advantage of Russian speakers in terms of their 
characteristics, engendered disadvantages against Ukrainian speakers. These effects 
overwhelmed the effects of reversal of patterns of ethnic subordination in the newly 
independent Ukraine. More recently, however, the advantage of Russian speakers 
diminishes both in terms of ethnic premia and characteristics, which may be a signal 
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